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a b s t r a c t
This paper shows that, in practice, the standard approach to scenario planning, known as
‘intuitive logics’, is overly focused on uncovering causes of one type, known as ‘efficient
cause’. We outline and apply a broader consideration of causes, leading to a more
sophisticated analysis of uncertainty. Our focus is on the incorporation of Aristotle’s
nuanced analysis of causation. We incorporate the features of our augmented scenario
development approach in a practical step-by-step methodology, and draw out several
implications for expert knowledge elicitation.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of International Institute of
Forecasters. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ern1. Introduction
Scenario planning is a technique for thinking about
the future that is employed widely by both business and
government organizations. It is designed to broaden and
challenge decision-makers’ perspectives, allowing them to
reconsider the standard assumption of ‘business-as-usual’
(van der Heijden, 2000; van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt,
Cairns, & Wright, 2002).
In a review of the literature, Wright, Bradfield, and
Cairns (2013) found that the three main objectives of the
application of scenario methods are to: (i) enhance our un-
derstanding of the causal processes, connections and log-
ical sequences underlying events, thus uncovering how a
future state of the world may unfold; (ii) challenge con-
ventional thinking, that is, reframe perceptions and change
the mindsets of those within organizations; and (iii) im-
prove decision-making, so as to inform strategy develop-
ment. Wright et al. (2013) emphasize that understanding
the connections, causal processes, and logical sequences
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ent futures, will challenge conventional thinking and will
also prove of benefit in improving organizational decision-
making and strategies.
As such, scenario methods are often qualitative in ap-
proach rather than quantitative, and are targeted at pro-
viding, side-by-side, alternative views of the nature of a
broad-brush future, where these views are elicited from
problem experts within a scenario team. This approach is
in sharp contrast to the common aim of expert knowledge
elicitation (EKE) methods, where the focus is on quanti-
fying experts’ single-point estimates of uncertain quanti-
ties, with some experts’ judgments potentially being given
more weight in the combination (c.f. Aspinall, 2010; Bol-
ger & Rowe, 2015; Morgan, 2014). Another difference be-
tween the scenario approach and typical EKE yields is that
scenario planning has no objective standard against which
to calibrate the validity of individual experts’ judgments. In
scenario planning, the focus is often on the distant future,
and the scenarios themselves are not forecasts but very
different alternative plausible futures that are intended to
‘bound’ the range of future possibilities, with each indi-
vidual scenario (if thought of as an intersection of many
events) having an infinitesimal likelihood of occurrence. In
ational Institute of Forecasters. This is an open access article under the CC
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pert opinion informally, often within a workshop setting.
In such situations, the scenario team facilitator’s role is to
generate a divergence of opinions, before finally facilitating
the convergence of these opinions into (usually) four sce-
nario storylines. See Wright and Cairns (2011) and Wright
et al. (2013) for more details of the scenario method.
There are a number of alternative approaches to sce-
nario planning (see Bradfield, Wright, Burt, Cairns, & Van
Der Heijden, 2005), but the one applied by far the most
commonly is that known as ‘intuitive logics’ (IL); see
Schwartz (1991), Foster (1993), and Vanston, Frisbee, Lo-
preato, and Poston (1977) for examples of the diversity
within the IL approach. IL is a plausibility-based approach
that enables participants, usually within a workshop set-
ting, to create narratives that describe unfolding chains of
causation, which resolve themselves into sets of distinct
future outcomes, usually four (Goodwin & Wright, 2010;
Phelps, Chan, & Kapsalis, 2001). Because it is based on plau-
sibility rather than probability or projection, it is argued
that a key advantage of IL over forecasting is its ability
to facilitate the management team’s consideration of chal-
lenging futures (Wright & Cairns, 2011;Wright &Goodwin,
2009).
Bradfield et al. (2005) identified four main areas of
usefulness of scenario work: making sense of a particular
puzzling situation; strategy development; anticipation;
and adaptive organizational learning. The flexibility of the
ILmethod lends itself to awide range of scenario purposes,
whether descriptive or normative, the scope of which
can be either extremely broad, as in the development of
global scenarios, or narrow, if focussed on the viability
of a single focal organization. See Wright and Cairns
(2011) for a discussion of the importance of defining
an ‘issue of concern’ clearly at the start of any scenario
enquiry. The present paper’s discussion focuses on the
causes of transformation in the business environment, and
therefore we consider our arguments and conclusions to
be applicable to all purposes that are inherent in scenario
work.
Recently, the effectiveness of IL in providing the ben-
efits of both understanding causality and challenging
business-as-usual thinking has been questioned (Wright
et al., 2013). In addition, IL has been shown to be determin-
istic (Derbyshire & Wright, 2014), in that ‘surprise’ futures
that have no salient causal linkage to participants’ present
viewpoints are not considered. Reflecting this inherent de-
terminism, IL has been shown to increase the focus on the
scenario workshop participants’ perspectives as to the full
range of plausible futures, which may be overly narrow
(Wright et al., 2013). Finally, the ILmethod has been shown
to lead to an increased confidence in views of causality that
may be mistaken (Wright & Goodwin, 2009).
The present paper argues that many of these problems
stem from a contradiction that is at the heart of IL. Specif-
ically, it purports to be a technique for thinking about the
future that eschews prediction; yet, in practice, its founda-
tions can be viewed as being built upon a predominant fo-
cus on causes of one type, known as ‘efficient cause’. As we
shall argue, this over-focus on efficient cause is one of themain factors that leads IL to narrow decision-makers’ per-
spectives as to the range of plausible futures, rather than
broadening them, as intended.
We argue that, in order to resolve this contradiction, it is
necessary to rethink the IL approach to developing scenar-
ios, such that it does not narrow the perspective by focus-
ing on only one type of cause. A nuanced and sophisticated
attempt to grapple with the inherent uncertainty of the fu-
ture requires us to consider as full a range of different types
of causes as possible, and to be aware of the conditions un-
der which identified causes lead to unexpected outcomes,
due to contingent conditions or countervailing factors. We
outline the underpinning logic for, and practical applica-
tion of, augmentations of the current ‘standard’ approach
to IL so as to enhance the analysis of causality. Our focus is
on the incorporation of Aristotle’s nuanced analysis of cau-
sation.
In the next section of this paper, we provide an
overviewof the conventional IL scenario development pro-
cess and demonstrate its reliance on the identification of
efficient cause. Section 3 then shows the limitations of this
focus. Section 4 demonstrates how the scenario develop-
ment methodology can be augmented to take into consid-
eration a much broader set of causes. Finally, Sections 5
and 6 develop and demonstrate a practical augmented
IL scenario development process which incorporates the
broader cause set. Thus, our paper enhances the analysis
of cause within the scenario process.
2. The current foundations of scenario development
2.1. The ‘standard’ IL approach to scenario development
While there are many different approaches to scenario
construction, Postma and Liebl (2005) have shown the
predominant approach to be that known as ‘intuitive
logics’ (IL). Following Ramirez and Wilkinson (2014), the
present paper refers to IL as the ‘standard’ approach to
scenario planning.
In chronological order, the approach requires the sce-
nario team members to identify an ‘issue of concern’ at
Stage 1, and predetermined elements and critical uncer-
tainties at Stage 2. This identification is initiated by asking
the scenario team to consider each of the six PESTEL di-
mensions in turn (political, economic, social, technological,
environmental, and legal). These separate driving forces,
of which there are often over 200 in a typical scenario ex-
ercise (c.f. Bradfield, Cairns, & Wright, 2015; van der Hei-
jden et al., 2002; Wright, Cairns, & Goodwin, 2009), are
then re-composed into clusters of ‘related’ forces, at Stage
3. This clustering is achieved across the PESTEL dimensions
by linking individual forces through ‘arrows of influence’
(as is illustrated in Fig. 1).
This allows the generation and naming of causally-
linked clusters of elements that are largely independent of
one another. In Stage 4, two ‘extreme’ but plausible sets
of outcomes are defined for each of the clusters. Stage 5
involves the identification of those cluster headings that
combine: (i) a high impact on the focal issue of concern
(usually the viability of the host or focal organization), and
256 J. Derbyshire, G. Wright / International Journal of Forecasting 33 (2017) 254–266Fig. 1. Example of an influence diagram produced at Stage 3 in a ‘real-life’ standard IL scenario planning exercise.(ii) a high uncertainty. At Stage 6, the two cluster head-
ings with (a) the greatest impact and (b) uncertainty over
what that impact will be, are selected as the ‘scenario
dimensions’ that are utilised for the production of four
detailed scenarios, which are developed with a common
temporal starting point, but end in four diverse, yet plau-
sible, causally-unfolded end-states. (A full illustration of
the practicalities of each of these six stages, and their out-
comes, in tutorial fashion is given by Wright and Cairns
(2011); to save space, we do not repeat this material here).
It is after this point that the scenario development may fo-
cus on a stakeholder analysis: what would each of a set of
stakeholders (e.g., competitors, regulators, customers, sup-
pliers, etc.) do to preserve or enhance its own interests as a
particular scenario unfolds (van der Heijden et al., 2002)?
This optional ingredient of the scenario mix is perceived to
add a degree of realism to the scenarios. If the focus of the
scenario exercise is strategy development, another possi-
ble stage is to evaluate the organization’s strategies (which
have previously been kept separate and distinct) against
each of the scenarios. Is a particular strategy robust to a
range of scenarios, or is it fragile against some? This focus
often leads to either (i) a re-design of strategic options or,
more fundamentally, (ii) a re-design of the success formula
of the organization.
It can be seen that the emphasis in scenario planning is
on uncovering the causal nature of the unfolding future.
As Burt, Wright, Bradfield, Cairns, and Van Der Heijden
(2006) note, scenarios are not predictions, extrapolations,
good or bad futures, or science fiction. Instead, they are
purposeful stories about how the contextual environment
could unfold over time, and consist of the following:
1. A description of a future end state in a horizon year — that
is, the combinations of uncertainties and their emer-
gent resolution at the final point in time in a particular
scenario story.
2. An internally consistent account of how a futureworldwill
unfold — that is, an explanation based on causal logic
as to how a particular scenario will unfold from the
past and present to the future. The story will represent
the dynamic interplay of predetermined elements and
resolved uncertainties, showing how these factors are
interconnected and impact each other, thus revealing
their logical consequences.Wright and Cairns (2011) document such a causal analysis
using data from a recent scenario planning intervention,
conducted by one of the present authors, in a major EU
bank that was involved in residential mortgage lending in
the last quarter of 2007. Two cross-disciplinary clusters
that were viewed by the mortgage business’ senior
managers to be of both (i) the highest uncertainty and
(ii) the highest impact on the bank’s operations were
illustrated. One cluster evidenced the bank’s concern with
residential house price rises – a factor which was seen
to be a pre-determined trend – and the effect of this on
the ability of mortgage applicants to service their debts.
The view was that these borrowers would be attracted
to ‘multi-generational mortgages’, where the debt is
passeddown to succeeding generations. The second cluster
evidenced the bank’s concerns with supermarkets offering
mortgage products, since these retailers already offered
savings accounts and credit cards. In short, and importantly
from the perspective of the present paper, a conventional
application of the IL methodology made no prompted
analysis as to what the scenario participants thought could
radically transform the bank’s then-current mortgage-
lending activity to make it either more or less successful.
Thus, scenario planning is designed to be an organizat-
ionally-based social-reasoning process, based on dialogue
and conversation, allowing participants’ perceptions of the
environment to be shared and facilitating participants’ in-
teractions as they engage in a process of sense-making
through theory building and storytelling. The emphasis of
the elicitation process is, simply, on identifying ‘cause’.
However, in practice, cause is left undefined (c.f. Bradfield
et al., 2015; van der Heijden et al., 2002; Wright et al.,
2009), and as such, workshop participants use the prof-
fered ‘arrows of influence’ in an unsophisticated, simplistic
way, as is shown in Fig. 1; i.e., loosely and without specific
direction by the workshop facilitator.
It should be noted that an ‘arrow of influence’ indicates
that the outcome of one particular (i.e., part of a cluster)
driving force (positioned at the start of an arrow) occurs
earlier in time than, and influences the resolution – as an
outcome – of, the particular driving force that is positioned
at the point of the arrow, representing a point that is later
in time. A further arrow then leads from this resolved driv-
ing force to a subsequent one which is still later in time,
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stract, a cluster of driving forces may potentially repre-
sent several sequences of future outcomes. Therefore, IL
is based on constructing a series of cause-and-effect rela-
tionships that lead to individual sets of future outcomes, in
a time-ordered sequence. The type of causation in which
earlier occurrence precipitates and brings about a later oc-
currence, in a chronological sequence of cause-and-effect
(van der Heijden, 2000), is known as ‘efficient cause’ (Ho-
cutt, 1974).
This – perhaps natural and unthinking – emphasis
on forces as being efficient causes shows IL practice to
be aligned with the Newtonian perspective on forces,
which is referred to as ‘Newtonian mechanics’, and, as its
name implies, views systems as operating in an inherently
mechanical fashion (Byrne, 2002; Orrell & McSharry,
2009). Newtonian mechanics has its origins in nineteenth
century physics, in which it was conceived as a system for
identifying how objects move under the influence of force
(Byrne, 2002). As is evident from the use of calculus in
modern-day neoclassical economics, which is also founded
inmechanics (Mirowski, 1989), this approach to reasoning
assumes that if a system’s current coordinates in state
space can be pinpointedwith sufficient accuracy, its future
coordinates – and, indeed, all of its past coordinates – can
be known too (Byrne, 2002; Makridakis & Taleb, 2009;
Orrell & McSharry, 2009). This implies that a unique set
of input coordinates leads to a single, unique outcome in
terms of the future position of the system, thus making
prediction possible. For example, positions within the
planetary systemover time canbepredictedwith precision
(Makridakis & Taleb, 2009).
Under Newtonian mechanics, a particular point in a
system’s trajectory leads to a particular subsequent point,
in a sequential (and entirely reversible) fashion. Thus,
each future position of the system is fully determined and
fully reflective of its current position, and there is only
one unique path to each individual future position of the
system. Similarly, each scenario developed in IL represents
a single set of antecedent (driving) forces, each of which
leads to a distinct, individual outcome via a sequence
of cause-and-effect relationships, whereby each ‘resolved’
cause (i.e., driving force) precipitates another outcome in
the chain until the sequenced outcome of the chain is
realised. Such a sequence of cause-and-effect relationships
is illustrated in Fig. 1. Note that, from the ‘efficient cause’
perspective on causality, a knowledge of the chain’s causes
implies a knowledge of the chain’s ultimate outcome,
meaning that, logically, it should be possible to identify
an ‘early warning’ or ‘weak signal’ (Derbyshire & Wright,
2014; Ramirez, Osterman, & Gronquist, 2013; Schoemaker,
Day, & Snyder, 2013). Here, an ‘earlywarning’ would be the
occurrence of a particular outcome at an early stage of the
pre-identified, sequenced chain of driving forces.
In recent years, many organizations have seen a strong
growth in ‘horizon-scanning’ activities and functions; see
for example horizon scanning by health organisations in
the UK and elsewhere.1 However, others have viewed
1 For horizon scanning exercises conducted for the UK National Health
Service, the World Health Organisation and other health-related bodies,
see http://www.cfwi.org.uk/our-work/horizon-scanning.such activities as being less than straightforward. For ex-
ample, Poli (2010a,b) has persuasively argued that sys-
tems (in our case, individual actors or societal structures,
where the latter include regulation, laws, etc.) make or
contain predictions of the future in their current deci-
sions/formulations. Similarly, the non-orthodox economist
G.L.S. Shackle (2010) wrote widely on the role of expecta-
tions in current decision-making. Thus, anticipated future
states influence the current state of a system, which con-
tradicts Newtonian models.
2.2. IL’s contradictory foundations
Our analysis (c.f. Wright & Goodwin, 2009) has shown
that the future is not driven solely by the systemic ac-
tions of driving forces abstracted from a PESTEL checklist
(c.f. the standard IL scenario development methodology,
above), but also involves the actions of human beings, as
they react to the unfolding of outcomes. Human action,
or inaction, increases the complexity of our understanding
of the ways in which the future might unfold. However,
this realisation of the primacy of self-interested human
action/intervention is a quite recent addition to the sce-
nario literature (c.f. Cairns, Śliwa, & Wright, 2010; Wright
& Goodwin, 2009). In short, standard IL, as currently con-
stituted and outlined earlier, is grounded in foundations
that imply prediction. This inherent determinism, as well
as the problem of an over-emphasis on efficient cause, will
be analysed further in the following sections of this paper.
We argue that IL’s current foundations need to be re-
thought and augmented with measures that are aimed
at mitigating the negative and bias-inducing effects of an
over-focus on the identification of efficient cause.We show
that this can be achieved by enhancing the current stan-
dard IL process using concepts (and derived practical steps)
from Aristotle’s philosophy of cause (Aristotle, 195). We
clear the ground for this discussion by further developing
our analysis of the positive and negative aspects of sce-
nario planning’s current emphasis on the identification of
perceptions of efficient cause-and-effect relationships, as
evidenced by the multi-stage standard approach set out
above. We then highlight alternative understandings of
‘cause’ that provide for a more comprehensive analysis
of causation, when incorporated into a practical scenario-
creation process.
3. Standard scenario planning and causation
3.1. Positive aspects of a focus on efficient cause
The process of constructing several sets of efficient
cause-and-effect relationships is beneficial in itself, as
it provokes participants to consider futures other than
‘business-as-usual’ — i.e., other than a simple extrapolation
of the present into the future. Essentially, this re-framing
effect is brought about through what is called the ‘simula-
tion heuristic’, which Tversky and Kahneman (1983) have
shown to occur when people are asked to create narra-
tive scenarios about the future. When an individual sim-
ulates (imagines) a causally-connected chain of outcomes,
he or she will perceive the resulting set of time-sequenced
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much more likely to occur than the actual probabilities at-
tached to the occurrence of the individual outcomes allow,
according to the intersection probability law.
The simulation heuristic is the basis on which IL has
its positive, perspective-broadening effect, since each sce-
nario constructed (i.e., a set of sequences of outcomes),
while standing in contrast to a simple extrapolation of the
present, is still perceived to be a plausible unfolding of its
constituent events. The simulation heuristic is an integral
part of the effectiveness of the IL process, and a foundation
stone for its usefulness as a tool for considering alternative
futures. This heuristic is invoked in fully-developed scenar-
ios by the use of narratives that describe the distinct sets
of outcomes as chains of efficient causes.
3.2. Negative aspects of a focus on efficient cause
3.2.1. Determinism
Nevertheless, this positive, perspective-broadening ef-
fect of the use of efficient cause in the standard IL approach
to scenario planning is balanced by several negative ef-
fects. Counter-intuitively, these act to narrow participants’
perspectives on the future, rather than broaden them. As
has been discussed, the use of unfolding chains of efficient
causes means that each scenario is determined individu-
ally. Each outcome precipitates the next in a sequential,
deterministic manner, resulting in a single set of future
outcomes (Phelps et al., 2001; Raubitschek, 1998). Since
each driving force may have more than one possible
outcome (c.f. Stage 4 of the standard IL approach, de-
scribed earlier), four sets of such outcomes are essential for
the construction of four separate, individually-determined
scenarios.
However, this simplicity in construction gives the mis-
impression that each end-state of a scenario has only a sin-
gle set of antecedent causes. For example, the end-state
of the cluster in Fig. 1 is a particular ‘level of growth of
inner-city housing in Glasgow’, UK. As a result, applying
the standard ILmethodology gives themisimpression that,
when such is an end-state, all that is necessary in order to
avoid undesirable futures is to be alert to the occurrence
of a particular sequence of events, and, if such unfold, to
take action to avoid the undesirable outcome described by
the scenario. Indeed, as has been discussed, this is the logic
that lies behind the current emphasis on ‘weak signals’
and ‘early warnings’ in both the scenario-planning litera-
ture and organisational horizon-scanning functions (Der-
byshire & Wright, 2014; Ramirez et al., 2013; Schoemaker
et al., 2013).
For example, Schoemaker et al. (2013) considered the
issue of scenarios being oriented more towards recognis-
ing and responding to ‘weak signals’ – i.e., trigger events
that indicate and initiate the unfolding of a causal chain
of events – in the external environment. These authors
argued that contemporary, highly networked, organiza-
tions have extensive points of contact with the external
world, but that this, while expanding the opportunities
for recognising emergent opportunities and threats, also
poses the threat of leaving the organization unable to spotuseful signals amongst the ‘avalanche of data’. They out-
lined an approach to seeking out such useful signals from
among background noise that was based on the adoption
of a ‘strategic radar system’, and illustrated the approach
with a brief case study of a large government agency. In
a similarly-focussed approach, Ramirez et al. (2013) used
case examples from Nokia and Statoil to document the re-
lationship between scenario development and the moni-
toring of early warning signals in a business environment.
In their case analysis, these authors explored the degree of
synergy between these two activities, and argued that the
combination of activities can create a potential competitive
advantage by providing top management with a continu-
ous strategic service, in contrast to the discontinuity that
is often inherent in a sequence of scenario exercises.
However, our analysis includes not only multiple pos-
sible futures, but also multiple possible paths to each fu-
ture. Each future end-state, such as a particular ‘level of
growth of inner-city housing in Glasgow’, hasmultiple pos-
sible sets of antecedent causes. The application of IL does
not preclude the identification of multiple causal sets of
antecedent causes; however, it is important to note that
this realisation that there may be multiple possible sets of
paths to a single future is unrecognised within the practi-
cal application of the IL approach to scenario development,
where the focus of elicitation and analysis is on the identi-
fication of a single set of causal relationships (Wright et al.,
2009), and has not been emphasised in any of the other ap-
proaches to scenario development that we have reviewed
(Bradfield et al., 2005). Crucially, it follows that, since there
are multiple possible sets of paths to any particular future,
actions that are designed to sensitise an organisation to the
early trigger events that initiate a single causal set of re-
lationships that result in a particular (un)desirable future
– so-called ‘horizon-scanning’ functional units – are mis-
placed. Thus, the uncertainty associated with the future is
muchmore complex than that implied by IL in its standard
format with its practice-based focus on efficient cause. As
we shall see, IL’s focus on efficient cause renders it overly
deterministic, and thus capable only of facilitating a sim-
plistic analysis of uncertainty.
With a similar emphasis on inappropriate simpli-
fication, Miller (2007, 2011) and Rhisiart, Miller, and
Brooks (2015) make the point that we should not at-
tempt to make probabilistic predictions of the future via
high/medium/low variations on a single theme, such that
we should not attempt to ‘colonise the future’with our per-
ceptions of the present-day. Ahlqvist and Rhisiart (2015)
and Slaughter (1998, 1999) also argue that, when de-
veloping scenarios, we should be aware of the simplify-
ing ‘paradigmatic’ assumptions and world-views that are
prevalent in particular futuresmethodologies; in our view,
this includes the very basic causal analysis that we have
highlighted within the standard IL approach.
3.2.2. Increased focus on futures caused by ill-defined
external shocks
Since the scenarios created in IL describe series of
causes which trigger other causes, the causes that are con-
sidered to initiate the causal sequence often represent ex-
ternal ‘shocks’. For example, consider the initial driving
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decisions (i.e., land release/zoning) and one is stabil-
ity/instability in interest rates, the pre-cursor of which
could be change in global financial systems. In practice,
such an external causation, which is often conceived as a
weakly-specified change in the basic PESTEL dimensions,
is often conceptualised by scenario workshop participants
as triggering chains of efficient causes. This is because any
deeper analysis will be both time-consuming and difficult.
For example, consider a hypothetical scenario-planning
exercise that is designed to consider the future of the UK
economy, or one particular part of it, such as financial ser-
vices (Cave, Derbyshire, & Yaqub, 2012). The development,
by workshop participants, of precipitative chains of causa-
tion (c.f. stage 3 of the standard IL process, detailed earlier)
will prompt a consideration of efficient causes as external
shocks to the system under scrutiny, rather than deeper-
lying, endogenously-generated causes. The result will be
the generation of both questions based on precipitative, ef-
ficient causes, such as ‘What might precipitate another fi-
nancial crisis?’, and answers that are also based on efficient
causes, such as ‘A series of speculative bubbles and crashes’
(c.f. Cave et al., 2012).
The emphasis demonstrated in this example is on
efficient cause, but the ‘cause’ is demonstrably poorly
understood, being simply the inflation and bursting of
a series of bubbles. This poorly-specified ‘cause’ leaves
unexplored the deeper, underlying reasons for the inflation
of such bubbles, including the contradictions that are
inherent in the financial system and are brought about
endogenously from within the system itself. Even when
these causes are developed more fully, as in the example
cited (Cave et al., 2012), the tendency, in practice, is
for participants to focus on superficial, precipitative,
trigger causes, rather than elaborating the underpinning
generativemechanismswhich create the conditions under
which such triggers have their precipitative power.
Thus, a focus on efficient cause in practical scenario
workshop settings can lead to only a shallow consideration
of the causal unfolding of particular futures in terms of
precipitative events, rather than a deeper consideration
of the particular system under scrutiny, which underpins
an event’s precipitative power. Such superficial analyses
can result in misattributions of cause (Wright & Goodwin,
2009).
4. How can scenario development methodology take
into consideration a broader set of causes?
4.1. Incorporating a full range of Aristotelian causes
Aristotle’s philosophical investigations (Aristotle, 195)
showed the issue of cause to be more complex than the
notion of efficient cause. Intuitively, if A causes B then A
precedes B in time and brings it about. Thus, A is implicated
directly in the occurrence of B, which would not occur
in its absence. Here, ‘cause’ is simply a relationship that
connects events (De Rond & Thietart, 2007) which occur
in chronological order. However, efficient cause is only one
of the fourmain types of cause that Aristotle distinguished,
known as efficient, material, formal and final. As has beennoted, a cluster of driving forces, as created in Stage 3 of
the standard IL scenario development method, is highly
dependent on a linear, chronological view of causes as
series of precipitative events. However, a focus on this type
of cause involves leaving the material, formal and final
causes unexplored.
4.1.1. Material cause: cause as a transformation
The original Aristotelian conception of ‘material cause’
is named as such because it refers to the material from
which something is made (Hocutt, 1974). An object’s
material nature determines (i) its present state, (ii) the
states to which it can transform, and (iii) the effects
that particular causes can have upon it. For example, the
material nature of wood means that its present state is
solid; however, burning causes it to transform into ash,
which is a qualitatively different material state. Note that
this is a step change to a different state, rather than a
change in the variable level of a present state. Similarly,
the material nature of water means it is liquid in warm
temperatures; however, freezing temperatures cause it to
transform into ice, which is again a qualitatively different
material state, rather than simply a variable change in its
present state.
Importantly, IL’s standard method of identifying effi-
cient cause is not concerned explicitly with the causes of
a step change leading to transformation. In Aristole’s anal-
ysis, on the other hand, material cause is of a focal impor-
tance in understanding change. The nature of the material
cause of transformation from one qualitative state to an-
other in our context, and the importance of identifying it,
were illustrated by Fushing, Jordà, Beisner, & McCowan’s
(2014) recent examination of the cause of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis. These authors demonstrated that the 2008
financial crisis was the result of a sudden, unintended,
system-wide loss of inter-banking network connections.
The nature of the network linking banks had shifted over
time from one that was characterized by a strong hierar-
chical control of transactions which was centered around
particularly powerful individual banks, to one in which the
control of transactions was distributedmuchmore widely.
This change in the control of the underpinning financial
network caused a material step change in the viability of
the overall financial system: it collapsed in 2008.
Such observable step-changes in material states are
associated strongly with the operation of complex systems
(c.f. Orrell & McSharry, 2009). Complex systems tend to
remain on particular trajectories or ‘paths’ over time, until
a point is reached at which the non-linear interactions
between particular causal factors, which often originate
endogenously but are fed back by the broader system in
which they occur, cause a sudden shift onto an alternative
development path. This change is represented as a ‘tipping-
point’ or bifurcation (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014).
Wilkinson, Kupers, and Mangalagiu (2013) analysed
how scenario development can benefit from the insights
that complexity science can offer. A focus of their
discussionwas on the systemic influences that lead to non-
linear shifts in the business environment. A key concept
that they identified was that of ‘feedback mechanisms’,
which will be dealt with in detail later, in Section 5.1.3.
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act to magnify emergent systemic effects, thus amplifying
their impacts. In our analysis, IL will provide little
consideration of step-change and its causation, since
the emphasis in the standard IL scenario development
method is predominantly on efficient cause, with little
consideration being given to material cause. Makridakis
and Taleb (2009, p. 728) note explicitly that mechanical-
based means for thinking about the future, as we
have shown IL to be, are incapable of taking into
account step changes, which they refer to alternatively as
‘turning points’. However, as we have argued, step-change
underpins the unfolding of significant, yet plausible,
futures.
4.1.2. Formal cause: cause as design
A ‘formal’ notion of cause can have a number of inter-
pretations, including natural tendencies or proclivities, and
also formal blueprint or structure. Under the latter inter-
pretation, ‘formal cause’ refers to what the object of causal
explanation ‘is’, or is intended to be (Dimov, 2011), in its
true essence. Thus, formal cause can be conceptualised as
the formal design of an actor’s or a structure’s activities. For
example, a local government’s planning department will
decide and regulate on land use in Glasgow city, within the
influence diagram presented earlier in Fig. 1.
Plans or blueprints for action can be considered ‘for-
mal causes’ (De Haan, 2006). From this perspective, the
production of a newly built house is ‘caused’ by its formal
blueprint, or the performance of a business is ‘caused’ by
its business plan (Dimov, 2011). Thus, the designs of ex-
isting regulatory structures and strategic plans define and
constrain the current and future activities of individuals
and organisations. MacKay and Tambeau (2013) focused
their conceptual analysis on the underlying basis of sce-
nario construction, and identified enduring social struc-
tures – including cultural and economic systems that are
governed by rules and resources – as the major determi-
nants of human actions. In so doing, they integrated ‘struc-
turation theory’ with the scenario method. Human actions
are seen here as being both constrained and facilitated by
existing social and economic structures, and these authors
therefore argue that the interactions between human ac-
tions and such structures are pivotal to our understanding
of the way in which the future might unfold.
4.1.3. Final cause: cause as motivated action
‘Final’ cause refers to the purpose or motivation un-
derpinning behaviours. The recent scenario literature has
seen an increased emphasis on uncovering stakeholders’
viewpoints on unfolding events (Cairns et al., 2010;Wright
et al., 2013). Hughes (2013) focused his analysis on the
influence of scenarios on public policy making. He ar-
gued that public policy makers are often powerful, and
can therefore shape and secure the future to a extent. This
level of power is in contrast to the level of power that can
be exerted by commercial organizations, with organiza-
tions often seeking protection, or robustness, in strategy
development and evaluation. Hughes’ analysis identifiedthe inter-relationships between the behaviours of power-
ful, self-interested actors and the components of unfold-
ing scenarios. He was concerned with the balance of both
power and interests (i.e., desires and values) between actor
groupings, as these forces interactwith technological capa-
bilities and technological change. In our analysis, powerful
stakeholders will act to preserve and enhance their own
interests within particular unfolding scenarios. However,
the standard IL approach has been shown to have only a
very limited emphasis on stakeholder concerns and pre-
dictable self-interested actions (Cairns et al., 2010; Wright
et al., 2013). Our analysis suggests that one reason for this
is the standard IL method’s over-emphasis on identifying
efficient rather than final causes.
A consideration of power and the powerful is absent
from the standard IL method of developing scenarios, yet
power structures can either block or enable changes that
are instigated by efficient cause. Considering formal cause
allows an understanding of individuals’ or organizations’
designed-in responsibilities and power to be obtained.
Considering final cause allows us to increase our under-
standing of the motivation of an individual or organization
to act, and therefore exercise power.
4.2. Contingent causation and countervailing factors
Each of these three alternatives to efficient cause – ma-
terial, formal and final – can be incorporated into the stan-
dard IL scenario development process as an augmentation.
Derbyshire and Wright (2014) cite Loasby (1999) as high-
lighting the provisional and tentative nature of all hu-
man notions of cause. This is due to countervailing factors,
which may prevent a particular cause from having an ef-
fect. Recently, the UK National Health Service introduced
a phone helpline that was aimed (formal cause) at reduc-
ing the patient burden on community-based general med-
ical practitioners and hospitals. However, the employment
of non-medically-trained call-handlers who followed tick-
box scripts (formal cause), rather than qualified doctors or
nurses who could employ judgement (formal cause), re-
sulted in an increased burden on hospitals (efficient cause)
since callers who did not receive credible advice were mo-
tivated (final cause) to seek expert advice from a hospi-
tal emergency department, overlooking the intermediate
point-of-help, the community general practitioner. All of
this resulted in several hospitals being categorised as fail-
ing (material cause). This is an exemplar illustration of how
causal forces may act as countervailing factors to prevent
an expected outcome arising froma designed formal cause.
In short, an analysis and understanding of contingent
conditions and countervailing factors is essential to a
full realization of an unfolding future. An analysis of the
interplay between the forces of efficient, material, formal,
and final causes provides a comprehensive portrayal of the
unfolding of future states of the world. As was noted in
Section 1, Bradfield et al. (2005) identified four main areas
of purpose in scenario work: making sense of a particular
puzzling situation; developing strategy; anticipation; and
adaptive organizational learning. The flexibility of the IL
method lends itself to a wide range of scenario purposes:
(i) either descriptive or normative, and (ii) with the scope
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Contrasting the conventional and augmented intuitive logics approaches to scenario development.
Stage Conventional IL approach Augmented IL approach
Stage 1: Setting the scenario agenda Defining the issue of concern and process, and
setting the scenario timescale.
Developing a detailed analysis of the present
(see Section 5.1.1) that incorporates the
identification of the material, formal and final
causes, as well as the efficient cause.
Stage 2: Determining the driving forces Eliciting a multiplicity of wide-ranging forces. Prompting the identification of the material,
formal and final causes, as well as the efficient
cause.
Stage 3: Clustering the driving forces Clustering causally-related driving forces,
testing and naming the clusters.
Focusing on transformation by prompting the
identification of the material, formal and final
causes, as well as the efficient cause.
Stage 4: Defining the cluster outcomes Defining two extreme, but plausible and
hence possible, outcomes for each of the
clusters over the scenario timescale.
The extreme scenarios are likely to become more
extreme because of the augmented Stage 3.
Stage 5: Impact/uncertainty matrix Ranking each of the clusters to determine the
critical uncertainties; i.e., the clusters that
have both the most impact on the issue of
concern and the highest degree of uncertainty
as to their resolution as outcomes.
No change.
Stage 6: Framing the scenarios Selecting two initial critical uncertainties to
create a scenario matrix, framing the
scenarios by defining the extreme outcomes
of the uncertainties.
No change.
Stage 7: Scoping the scenarios Building a broad set of descriptors for each of
the four scenarios.
Prompting the identification of causal loops.
Stage 8: Developing the scenarios Developing scenario storylines, including key
events, their chronological structures, and the
‘who and why’ of what happens.
The scenarios are likely to emphasize radical
transformational change because of the
augmented Stages 3 and 7.being either extremely broad, as in the development of
global scenarios, or narrow, if focussed on the viability of a
single focal organization. In our analysis, our focus on the
various types of causes of transformation in the business
environment means that our arguments and conclusions
are applicable to all of the varied purposes that are inherent
in scenario work (c.f. van der Heijden et al., 2002). In
short, the elicitation of driving forces should be re-framed
as a process of identifying the forces (i) that can cause
step-change transformation, (ii) whose formal design can
either facilitate or restrict change, and (iii) where actor
motivations and actions can either facilitate or restrict
change.
5. Augmenting the scenario development method
In this section, we outline some adaptations and aug-
mentations to the standard IL scenario development pro-
cess, in order to reduce the current over-emphasis on
efficient cause. We demonstrate that these changes trans-
form IL from a tool that, in practice, focuses predominantly
on efficient, precipitative causes, to one that encompasses
all three alternative types of cause that are outlined in this
paper. We set out these adaptations and augmentations
below, linking each to the analysis of a specific alternative
cause. See Table 1 for an overview of our augmented IL ap-
proach.
5.1. Uncovering the material cause of transformations from a
present state to a future state
As we shall see in the following proposal for an aug-
mented Stage 1 of the IL scenario development process,an analysis of the past can provide clues as to the types of
causal relationships that will tend to continue into the fu-
ture in the focal system of influences. However, standard
IL currently devotes little attention to the consideration of
either the present state or how it has come to be.
5.1.1. Providing a detailed analysis of the present as a
‘common starting-point’ for scenario development
Stage 1 of IL, described earlier, focuses on uncovering
the ‘issue of concern’ to the focal organization. Our anal-
ysis suggests that this focus should be developed so as
to become a more integral part of the scenario-planning
exercise, providing more context for the future. An ex-
panded Stage 1 should provide a detailed description of the
‘present state’ of the focal system, which can then be used
to underpin the development of subsequent scenarios, pro-
viding a common starting-point for each unfolding chain of
causation that leads to sets of varying future outcomes. As
a part of this rich description of the present state, efforts
should be made to understand how this present has come
to be, since this analysiswill provide causal clues as towhat
may occur in the future.While future causes and outcomes
may differ from those of the past, the past can nevertheless
provide clues as to the types of causal mechanisms that are
present within the focal system.
To achieve this, an augmented Stage 1 should take the
form of a short exercise in which participants describe the
present situation in detail, and highlight the causal fac-
tors that they consider to have led to the present situation.
Specifically, participants should be prompted to identify
the factors (i) that caused step-change transformation, (ii)
whose formal design either facilitated or restricted change,
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tated or restricted change. As currently practiced, IL does
not take advantage of all of the benefits that can be de-
rived from history. History is taken into account to some
extent through the consideration of predetermined ele-
ments, but this focuses on things that remain the same
over time, rather than examining historical change and its
causes. Templates such as PESTEL (c.f., Section 2.1) focus
on what is immediately salient at present, and provide lit-
tle room for considerations of how things have developed
over time to date, how one identified driving force may
have gained in prominence over time, or how previous
significant changes or surprises were the results of partic-
ular important driving forces. In standard IL practice, de-
scribed earlier, scenarios are constructed as developments
from the present, without any explicit consideration of
the process through which that present came to be. How-
ever, future developments will be influenced by a contin-
uation of the causes that underpin the present. Some of
these underpinning driving forces will be trend-based. It
is worth noting that one of the seminal founders of sce-
nario thinking also placed a strong emphasis on uncover-
ing continuing trends (c.f. Wack, 1985). The more recent
decrease in interest on the continuing elements of the fu-
ture is understandable, given that scenario planning is now
viewed by academics and practitioners as an alternative to
forecasting (van der Heijden, 2000). However, the present
analysis indicates that focused search and analysis should
emphasise the identification of endogenous change that is
brought about fromwithin the focal system itself. This will
allow developments in the future to be reconnected with
the present and past.
In many respects, we believe that this augmented ap-
proach, which incorporates a much more detailed initial
stage, is more in keeping with the original intentions of
scenario planning.While there has been an exponential in-
crease in the literature on scenario planning (Hodgkinson,
Whittington, Johnson, & Schwarz, 2006; Varum & Melo,
2010), van Asselt, van’t Klooster, van Notten, and Smits’
(2010) reviewof thewide range of scenarios that have been
developed and documented in the literature concluded
thatmost of the accounts of the development processwere
merely relatively short descriptions of themain steps. Con-
sequently, ‘choices, considerations, discussions, struggles,
compromises, unproductive steps, flaws, practical adjust-
ments, experiments, difficulties, challenges and local solu-
tions are concealed’ (van Asselt, van’t Klooster, van Notten,
& Smits, 2010, p. 11). In keeping with this, we contend that
most of the accounts infer that the development process
is relatively straightforward and linear; little attention is
paid to segregating out what is predetermined and what
is uncertain; and the nature of any perceived causality has
been analysed only superficially. This includes any focus
on the role of history in understanding how the present
situation has come about and how it may evolve in the
future. Thus, important causes of past significant changes
and their potential to be repeated, albeit in different con-
texts, leading to subtle but important differences in the
ways in which they play out, are therefore overlooked. To
some extent, the scenario process has become a somewhat
simplistic, off-the-shelf tool which allows management to‘tick the box’ in terms of future-proofing and a considera-
tion of the future. The simplistic way in which the IL pro-
cess has been documented in themajor practical textbooks
(see, for example, van der Heijden et al., 2002; Wright &
Cairns, 2011), though with the good intention of widening
access to scenario practice and invoking discussion, may
have contributed to this inadvertently.
The process of creating a detailed description of the
present, within an augmented Stage 1, will also provide
a preliminary perspective on varying stakeholder views
of the focal system as it currently is. Such views may be
positive, negative or indifferent. The standard IL process
includes nothing that provides for the uncovering of these
varying interpretations of the present state, other than the
initial discussion in Stage 1 of the ‘issue of concern’ for
which the scenario-planning exercise is being conducted.
5.1.2. Enhancing the influence diagram to make it more
explicitly about transformation
The detailed description of a present state that results
from an expanded Stage 1 should be referred to at the
point in Stage 2 when the driving forces are created.
This would reinforce participants’ understanding that the
process that is being considered involves continuation as
well as change, resulting in more emphasis being given to
the identification of pre-determined elements, as opposed
to uncertainties.
The influence diagramsdeveloped at Stage 4 of the stan-
dard IL scenario development process start with ‘funda-
mental’ drivers (i.e., forces that are linked closely to the
basic PESTEL categories) on the left-hand side of the dia-
gram, whose ‘arrows of influence’ are directed from one
subsequent cause to the next in a left-to-right direction,
until the end-point, which is usually to the right of the dia-
gram and represents the resolved outcome, is reached. In-
cluding a brief analysis of the present state to the left of
the diagramallows thenewly developed influence diagram
to reinforce the scenario as one of stability, and changes
the focal system from the present to the future. Further-
more, this inclusion of a common starting point facilitates
the comparison of different influence diagrams, thus pro-
viding the contextwithinwhich to consider the plausibility
of alternative unfolding causal paths to the future from a
commonly-agreed present. This can also assist in deciding
on the placement of the clusters in Stage 5, the stagewhich
determines the essential basis for the narrative scenarios.
Including present-state descriptions can also assistwith
the actual writing of scenario narratives in Stage 8, since
it is easier to set out the scenario story-lines in terms of
explicit start and end points. The left-hand side of Fig. 2
provides an example of such an augmented influence dia-
gram for the level of growth of inner-city housing in Glas-
gow that we presented in Fig. 1 for the original approach.
Indeed, the housing strategies of local authorities in
the UK, as incorporated in the example in Fig. 2, provide
a further example, and one which is highly salient at
present, as to why it is important to take into account the
broad range of causes that we have argued for. As another,
contrasting, housing example, consider the housing issue
in London, which is located 350 miles south of Glasgow.
A lot has been written recently about the ‘housing crisis’
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of this crisis, encompassing all four of the aspects of
cause that we have highlighted: efficient, material, formal
and final. A highly simplistic analysis based purely on
efficient cause would perhaps identify sharp increases
in rent as being the direct cause of the crisis, perhaps
precipitated by an insufficient supply of new housing.
However, a more nuanced causal analysis would unpick
the underlying factors that are contributing to this lack
of supply. As was discussed by Foster (2015), the causes
of the housing crisis include the insufficient availability of
land (material cause), which is exacerbated by planning
regulations and bureaucracy (formal cause) that make it
difficult to build on what little land there is available.
The resulting constraint in the housing supply has now
been exacerbated further by the UK government’s ‘Right
to buy’ scheme (formal cause), which allows tenants in
local government social housing to purchase the property
that they are renting. The theory is that local authorities
will then use the money thus raised to build replacement
social housing. However, as has been noted, some areas,
especially in London, do not have any land available for this
(material cause); also, elsewhere, the difference between
the revenue raised from selling a ‘Right to buy’ property
and the cost of building a new property is so large, not
least during a period of austerity, that local authorities
cannot afford to build the replacement property that is
required (material cause). As a result, local authorities in
London have had to return £250m in revenue raised from
selling social housing to the central government, because
they have been unable to spend it on building replacement
social housing. Finally, these problems are exacerbated
further by foreign investors buying property or land andkeeping it empty or unbuilt on, simply as an investment,
essentially banking the property or land and waiting for
prices to increase. They are motivated to do this by the
rapidly increasing land and house prices (final cause). This
action by investors has the effect of increasing house prices
further, making it still more desirable to buy and withhold
houses and land, in the circular fashion of a causal loop,
leading to transformation (in this case, the transformation
from a situation of adequate supply to a housing crisis).
Of course, some of these causes in our London example
above, or in our Glasgow example in Fig. 2, might be identi-
fied through a PESTEL analysis in any case (c.f. Section 2.1),
and so picked up by a scenario planning exercise that em-
ployed the standard IL approach as it is currently consti-
tuted. However, stating the four different types of causes
explicitly, and adapting the IL process specifically to un-
cover them, as described below, results in a greater likeli-
hood of the full range of important causes being uncovered.
Moreover, a consideration of the category of cause, as in the
Glasgow example in Fig. 2, assists in the process of under-
standing how the various causes combine to bring about
(in the London case) a negative transformation, and how
strategies can be put in place to mitigate, or potentially re-
verse, the effects of this. The interactions between causes
can be understood better when causal types are identified.
For example, the ‘cause’ related to a sclerotic planning sys-
tem and excessive bureaucracy might be mitigated by a
one-off release of a large amount of available land, such
as brownfield (i.e., former industrial land) or greenfield,
through a planning process that is specifically designed to
be minimal and to allow the release of this land for de-
velopment as soon as possible. However, if the final cause
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velopment land is not addressed simultaneously, address-
ing the formal cause related to the planning system and
its bureaucracy may do little to alleviate the problem. Re-
solving the problem, leading to a transformation back to
non-crisis conditions, would require a combination of ac-
tions aimed at addressing each of the different types of
causes, taken in combination. Understanding the natures
of these different causes assists in thinking this through,
and thinking through the effects on the other causes of ac-
tions that are taken to resolve one cause. An action that is
taken to resolve one particular cause might actually exac-
erbate one of the other causes, causing the crisis to worsen
rather than improve, because of complex and contingent
causation, and the causal interactions this leads to.
5.1.3. Analysing the potential for transformation — material
cause
As was noted above, the influence diagrams that are
constructed as part of IL currently tend to consist of causes
that are linked by ‘arrows of influence’ which run from
left to right in a linear fashion, thus reinforcing IL’s de-
terminism, which we associated earlier with its focus on
efficient cause. Causal looping, in which a cause and its
effect are shown to influence each other, are not a com-
mon or standard feature in IL influence diagrams. How-
ever, we consider that the importance of causal loops
should be expressed to scenario workshop participants
explicitly, and that such loops should be included in in-
fluence diagrams whenever possible, in order to dilute
determinism and to emphasise the fact that transforma-
tional change can emerge through self-reinforcing positive
feedback. Such positive feedback, as represented by causal
loops, may lead to tipping points and bifurcations, which
are the very essence of a step-change in the nature of the
future, whether these are considered positive or negative.
In Fig. 2, we have added such a loop between the driv-
ing force labelled ‘Stability/instability of interest rates’ and
that labelled ‘Degree of confidence in housing market’,
since the two will affect each other, potentially leading
to positive feedback. For example, a volatile housing mar-
ket that booms and crashes leads to an instability in inter-
est rates, which in turn affects confidence in the housing
market. As in Fig. 2, influence diagrams may include mul-
tiple such self-reinforcing or circular causal relationships,
somewith the potential to cause transformationalmaterial
change.
5.2. Uncovering the impacts of formal and final causation
Wright et al. (2013) emphasised the importance of plac-
ing an enhanced stakeholder analysis at the heart of sce-
nario development methodology, in order to challenge
conventional thinking and increase the heterogeneity of
the viewpoints discussed. Similarly, Wright and Goodwin
(2009) argued for a more intense focus on stakeholder
analysis in scenario development, with a particular focus
on analysing stakeholders’ actions to preserve and enhance
their own interests as events in the PESTEL environment
unfold by efficient cause (Wright et al., 2013). This new
emphasis in scenario development is in accord with ourownemphasis on evaluating the effects of final cause. Bein-
hocker (1997, 2006) noted that traditional economic the-
ory is analogous to Newtonian physics, and is not a valid
predictor of behaviour. In contrast, the recent emphasis
within economics on behavioural economics focuses on
gaining an understanding of human psychology, as does
our present focus on understanding final cause. However,
our present analysis adds a nuance: the self-interested ac-
tions of powerful stakeholders will be affected, i.e., facili-
tated or restricted, by formal cause, e.g., regulations, legal
requirements, institutional structures, organizational mis-
sions, etc.
As we have discussed, considerations of the future re-
quire the realisation that there are both multiple possible
futures and multiple possible paths to each of these. Ac-
tions by the powerful may shift the course of events onto
an alternative pathway; however, since there are multiple
paths to each future, this does not necessarily imply that
an undesirable future will be avoided. In addition, analyses
of stakeholder motivations and power and structural con-
straints will reveal the potential for contingent and coun-
tervailing cause, which may either enable or countervail
any intended goal.
6. Conclusion
The efficacy of the ‘standard’ IL approach to scenario
planning has recently been questioned in the scenario-
planning literature. This paper has added to the debate
by identifying an additional deficiency in the standard
development approach, namely that its inherent practice-
based determinism leads to a perspective-narrowing
effect. Scenario planning purports to be a technique
which denies the possibility of prediction, instead offering
alternative ways of thinking about the future based on
plausibility. However, IL does in fact focus on prediction,
but only within individual scenarios. This ‘mechanical’
basis, as evidenced by IL’s emphasis on uncovering ‘driving
forces’, results in an over-emphasis on one type of
cause, known as efficient cause, leading to deterministic
scenarios that are based on precipitative cause-and-effect
pathways into the future.
This paper has highlighted the dangers of over-
emphasising efficient cause in scenario development.
These include the misimpression that each possible future
has a single set of antecedent causes, leading in turn to
a misimpression as to the usefulness of ‘weak signals’ or
‘early warnings’, which, as we have discussed, is currently
prevalent in the horizon-scanning literature.
In response to these issues and problems with the stan-
dard IL approach, we have proposed various augmenta-
tions to the standard IL approach which, when employed
together, provide for a broader consideration of cause in
terms of transformation, structuration, and human moti-
vations, incorporating three additional types of cause: ma-
terial, formal and final. The suggested augmentations also
provide a lens for considering countervailing factors and
contingent conditions inwhich the different types of cause,
and causal agents, may act either in conjunction or in op-
position to the effects of efficient cause. The latter anal-
ysis and the resulting insights are important, since they
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ing in expected causal relationships, as uncovered by a su-
perficial efficient-cause-focussed analysis, failing to play
out as expected. Our analysis showed that it is crucial to
consider countervailing factors and contingent conditions
when constructing scenarios for the future, since this is the
only way to enable the participants in scenario develop-
ment exercises to gain full insights into the causation un-
derpinning unfolding futures.
In terms of expert knowledge elicitation practice, our
application of Aristotle’s nuanced analysis of cause enables
us to both decompose and evaluate the reasons underpin-
ning a particular judgment or prediction; e.g., the probabil-
ity that next year’s level of growth in inner-city housing in
Glasgow will be greater than 10% (c.f., Figs. 1 and 2), or the
probability that at least one supermarket chain will offer
residential mortgages in the coming year, etc (c.f. Wright
& Cairns, 2011, p. 49). Recall that the common focus of
expert knowledge elicitationmethods is on the quantifica-
tion of experts’ single-point-estimates of uncertain quanti-
ties, with some experts’ judgments potentially being given
more weight in the combination. The elicitation and ex-
plication of the causal reasoning underpinning the prof-
fered estimates will allow an expert to both consider the
reasoning of another expert and, perhaps, defer to it, thus
allowing a self-regulated weighting of individuals’ opin-
ions and judgments. Future use of this type of enhanced
reasoning-appreciation-and-evaluation procedure is sup-
ported by the results of the extant research on the use of
the Delphi technique for aggregating individual opinions.
This study has shown an exchange of the rationales for par-
ticular opinions to improve the validity of the Delphi yield;
for a discussion of the research on this issue, see Bolger and
Wright (2011), and for proposals for linking theDelphi out-
come research to the EKE literature, see Bolger and Rowe
(2014, 2015).
In workshop-based applications of scenario planning,
the informal aggregation of expert opinions will also be
enhanced by the elicitation of participants’ underpinning
‘‘rich’’ reasoning, before the facilitated convergence of indi-
vidual opinions into separable scenario storylines. As such,
the use of our practical application of Aristotle’s nuanced
decomposition of causalitywill assist thosewho are partic-
ipating in expert groups in scrutinising the reasoning un-
derpinning particular anticipations of the future.
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